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Disponible en Internet el 21 de mayo de 2009Prevention is a medical and social aspiration with a long
history, as has been shown, for example in the customary
norms regarding leprosy and lepers. Great advances that
have had a huge impact on the health of the population are
due to prevention, such as the provision of clean water and
vaccination against smallpox. However, prevention is also an
activity in which the deﬁnition has changed over the years
from being largely conﬁned to the ﬁeld of public health to
becoming an important area in daily medical practice,
especially since the introduction of the concept of a ‘‘risk
factor’’ by the mid XX century1.
Despite this change, the basic idea of prevention as an
activity which avoids future harm is still valid. In other
words, clinical prevention is all the preventative activities
which can be carried out by doctors with their patients
during the clinical interview, with the aim of avoiding major
harm in the future thanks to the detection of signs and
symptoms of different degrees of relevance. Generally,
prevention activity is provided to the patient as afront matter & 2009 Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L. Todos los de
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speciﬁc ethical problems with it, which should not be
ignored2. While some activities are well accepted by the
public and scientiﬁc community, such as the vaccination
against poliomyelitis, others are controversial, such as the
PSA determination for early prostate cancer diagnosis3.
Some aspects of clinical prevention are seen as a basic
activity which almost obviates the need to develop clinical
judgment. For example, if we accept the decision to carry
out a mammogram screening on all women from the ages of
50 to 65 every two years, in the medical ofﬁce there is just
one requirement to be included in the criteria, which is that
the woman should fulﬁll the criteria of age and the time
elapsed since the last mammogram. This apparent simplicity
is strengthened by the use of tables and computers, even in
ﬁelds with high complexity such as cardiovascular risk. But
this on its own, does not eliminate the need for decision
making which has to take into account the complexity of a
particular patient4,5.
In this article the opposing forces that exist within the
patient encounter between the apparent simplicity of the
prevention activities and the complexity of clinical decision
making are addressed, from the point of view of the doctor.Prudence in decision making when faced
with uncertainty
Being a medical doctor implies carrying out rapid and
appropriate clinical decisions under circumstances ofrechos reservados.
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Family Medicine doctors/General Practitioners than to
specialists6–9. Obviously, this uncertainty needs to be
limited and the scope of the unavoidable estimated, as
rapid decision making in conditions of uncertainty results in
professional and personal angst, as both the patient’s health
and the doctor’s reputation are at stake. For this reason it is
essential to give the right response. However, despite
making the best possible decision, undesirable results are
not always avoided, including the death of the patient,
which adds to the feeling of failure and anxiety. Unfortu-
nately, no matter how unavoidable uncertainty is in clinical
practice, students and doctors are not generally taught how
to control feelings of failure and anxiety in their training, or
how to deal with them.
There are two false solutions for artiﬁcially reducing
uncertainty, either by increasing the number of diagnostic
tests (and the generation of ‘hard data’ in which the
interpretation generates a vicious circle of yet more
uncertainty) or by increasing the preventive component in
the medical encounters. All medical encounters offer
opportunities for preventive actions10, but the artiﬁcial
ﬁlling of the encounter with preventative actions merely
makes a considered decision in the face of uncertainty more
difﬁcult when dealing with patient suffering. Instead of
holding the balance between being a ‘healer’ and a
‘scientist’, the medical profession is slowly moving towards
the illusory safety of the latter, reinforced mainly by a
biological interpretation of medicine based on biometric
tests and on excessive prevention without any proper
debate on the topic11.
Given that the agency relationship exists, and will always
exist, in which the doctor makes decisions as a patient’s
agent12, it is essential that the doctor sees the case as
unique, and should take into account the circumstances and
values of the patient, which may be different in each
medical encounter, and should make appropriate and
individualised decisions. However, habits should not be
prescribed, especially as a result of ignorance on the part of
the professional regarding the patient’s real motivations.
For example, the source of pleasure and the reasons for
living can be very different for each patient and for each
doctor, either because of personal circumstances, or
because of social class differences. It is necessary to try to
understand people and their decisions, a very different
approach from the deterministic one in which only ‘eviden-
ce’ (tests) is considered, and not the ambivalence and
complexity of the human being.
The simpliﬁed linear reasoning of cause and effect that
underpins prevention postpones anxiety, but does not solve
the problems which are created by decision making in
processes involving uncertainty. In the face of anxiety and
failure one possible, practical and rational answer exists
based on a responsible decision made after debate which
eliminates irrational and destructive feelings of guilt. When
dealing with uncertainty there is no perfect answer; what is
needed is a considered one, adapted to the circumstances
and to the speciﬁc case and shared with the patient. The
aim is to do things well, to make thoughtful decisions based
on clinical judgment and on common sense. The clinical
reaction should be based on rational choice13, not on
random preventative actions. Rationality and sensitivitybring with them responsibility, not anxiety or guilt, and can
be used to justify one’s actions in judgment of bad praxis.Complexity in preventive decision making
The apparent consistency of some of the instruments used in
preventive activities, such as protocols, clinical guidelines
and risk tables, can result in the complexity of their use in
practice being forgotten. For example, risk tables are used
for decision making, despite the fact there are no studies
available that evaluate the impact of the leap from the
knowledge of the population of origin from which the table
is derived, to the particular patient to whom the data are
applied, the so called ‘‘clinical-statistical tragedy’’14,15.
Thus, the preventive guides come to be applied routinely
and indiscriminately without taking into account the
particular individual context.
Nevertheless, even the supporters of risk tables acknow-
ledge the complexity of the obvious. Thus, it can be read: ‘It
is an unquestionable fact that most of the tables are
restricted to just a few risk factors (there are other risk
factors such as obesity, family history and other emerging
factors which the tables do not take into account), and
have a sensitivity which does not surpass 50%, and therefore
have a low predictive power to identify individuals who
will go on to have a fatal cardiovascular event. Unfortuna-
tely, any existing table is far from being an instrument
of high precision, and so should be considered as a useful
tool in primary prevention in cardiovascular diseases but
only if it does not replace clinical judgment, and all
exceptions and precautions are considered at the moment
of implementation4.
Despite this call for prudence, in the daily clinical
practice a reductionist and linear view of cause and effect
has been imposed, which aspires to modify the unpredic-
table future with simple preventive measures. Improve-
ments in health have been attributed to health care
activities carried out previously, with little scientiﬁc basis.
In fact, the beneﬁts of preventive activities on the risk
factors can only be evaluated by their impact on the
population, not the individual. This population aspect in the
prevention of risk factors is frequently forgotten14,16,17 and
could lead from the ‘‘imposition of health and of things
healthy’’18,19 to the ‘‘sacriﬁce’’ of the patient for the good
of the community instead of a healthy option for ‘‘sustaina-
ble personal health’’20. Thus the doctor should act as the
patient’s agent and not be blinded by norms and measures,
which while true within the population, result in a over-
simpliﬁcation of the individual preventive and curative
clinical decision21, in such a way that the patient could see
himself simply as an anonymous being, characterised by age
and gender, and little else, to whom standards, such as
cardiovascular risk tables, are applied. Furthermore, pre-
vention often lacks negative feedback (as has been
demonstrated by screening of PSA of prostate cancer, where
everything is seen as good: ‘‘if the test results are normal,
relief follows, if the PSA is high a biopsy and prostatectomy
will be carried out, and so avoid one death by cancer’’)
which complicates the situation further22.
Even in the case of extremely simple preventive
decisions, such as the carrying out of mammogram screening
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65, the situation becomes less simple in the clinical
practice. In this particular case, the complexity stems from
the difﬁculties in transferring sufﬁcient and relevant
information to the woman so that she can make her own
informed and reasoned decision. Thus false expectations
and errors in the appreciation of risks, beneﬁts and harm
due to the mammogram screening are considered to be a
public health problem23,24 which is not consistent with the
simple and routine recommendation that ‘‘the mammogram
saves lives’’. How does it save lives and how can women be
adequately informed about the need to participate in a
preventive activity which speeds up the diagnosis of silent
cancers in one in seven cases, and delays the diagnosis of
aggressive cancer in one in nine cases?25.
Prevention, due to its complexity, cannot be simply
prescribed without serious justiﬁcation. Prevention also
brings uncertainty26,27. For example, when prevention is
offered to the elderly, all that may be achieved is a change
in the cause of death28. How is one informed and who
decides? Two questions which are also relevant in the other
previously mentioned case, and the determination of PSA for
prostrate cancer screening3,26.Conclusion
Decision making in the face of uncertainty is consubstantial
with the medical encounter. In the face of anxiety and
feelings of failure which arise from medical decision making
there is no place for false solutions of an aggressive-
defensive medicine, or for irrational prevention. The ﬁrst
feeds a vicious circle of information which is difﬁcult to
interpret and the second is based on the illusory simplicity
of the preventive endeavour. A more rational response
would involve calm reﬂective decision making and the
constant evaluation of the implicit uncertainty in all
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